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The IPO Derby: Are there consistent Losers and Winners on this track? Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) document the long-run underperformance of initial public offerings (IPOs). Subsequent studies have focused on identification of factors that affect the long-run performance of IPOs. Size of the newly-public firm and the effect of venture-capital backing (Brav and Gompers (1997) ), underwriter reputation (Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) , Logue, Rogalski, Seward and Foster-Johnson (2002) ) and discretionary accrual effects (Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) ) are among the various factors associated with IPO long-run performance examined in the recent literature. 1 Our study of these previously identified factors associated with IPO long-run performance has led to two distinct sets of important findings. First, we find that a confluence of the previously identified determinants of IPO long-run performance is more important than the effect of any individual factor.
Second, we identify a set of factors that have a consistent long-run underperformance and a combination of factors that is associated with significantly positive IPO long-run performance. Past literature has documented samples of IPOs that, at best, match the market's performance. To our knowledge, this is the first study to combine previously known factors to isolate a subset of IPOs that outperform their benchmark in the long-run.
Prior research has not examined these determinants of IPO long-run performance in combinations and it is not evident from earlier studies whether these attributes are independent or overlapping, and whether they affect the entire sample or sub-samples only. Moreover, each of the prior studies uses a different sample period and method to examine the long-run performance of IPOs. Thus it is difficult to make direct comparisons and it is not evident whether the differences across studies are driven by different samples, sample periods, and/or different methods. Finally, empirical evidence regarding the underwriter reputation effect is mixed (Carter et al (1998) , Logue et al (2002) ). Thus, the question of underwriter reputation and its relation with the long-run performance of IPOs, if any, is not unambiguous.
A principal objective of our study is to resolve these issues.
Is it likely that the various attributes identified in earlier studies are independent? Venture-capital firms are routinely represented on the boards of the new business venture and their close association with 1 Brav and Gompers (1997) examine the performance of newly public firms, with and without the backing of venture-capital (VC) firms, and find that the underperformance is limited to small nonventure-backed IPOs only. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) study the effects of earnings management by firms going public. They document that IPOs' underperformance is attributable to the unusually high discretionary accounting accruals in the IPO-year. Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) examine the effects of underwriter reputation on the long-run outcome of IPOs and document a less severe underperformance for IPOs brought to the market by more prestigious underwriters. In contrast, Logue, Rogalski, Seward and Foster-Johnson (2002) revisit this question and do not find evidence to support the impact of underwriter reputation on the long-run performance of IPOs. the IPO firm is over a relatively longer time horizon than the association of the IPO firm with the investment banking houses. On the other hand, investment banking houses routinely evaluate businesses.
Arguably, higher quality investment banking houses possess relatively greater valuation experience and expertise than venture-capital firms. As for the IPO firm, it has the incentive to dress up its earnings if doing so can fetch better valuation. However, underwriters and venture-capital firms are professional certification agents with independent stakes in their own reputation. Systematic inability to detect managed earnings could affect their reputational capital. Moreover, their reputational capital would be adversely affected if their impact as a certification agent were to be subsumed by that of another agent.
Nonetheless, dressed-up earnings are not quite transparent and the need to assess firm quality may not necessarily translate into success in detecting the size of accruals in earnings. For instance, Teoh and Wong (2002) suggest that analysts appear unable to detect earnings that contain a large accruals component. Thus, it is feasible that the underwriter reputation and the venture capital effects are separate and independent and that either one or both of these certification agents are unable to detect the level of earnings management by the firm going public.
Could the various attributes identified in earlier studies be manifestations of one phenomenon? Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens (1990) document that small nonventure-backed firms go public with lower tier underwriters and may have fewer and lower quality analysts following the firm in the post-IPO period. Since asymmetric information is likely to be more prevalent for small firms, it is possible that the impact of the discretionary accrual component of earnings is more pronounced for smaller firms. If both venture capitalist and prestigious investment banking houses are able to detect the level of earnings management, then each of these attributes may be overlapping. Studying their association with the long-run performance of IPOs in isolation could lead to a similar conclusion for each. Therefore, there is reason to believe that firm size, venture-capital backing, underwriter reputation and the level of discretionary accruals may have overlapping influence on the long-run performance of IPOs.
We combine these separate strands of research to examine the relation between size of the newly-public firm, venture-capital backing, underwriter reputation, level of earnings management and the IPO long-run performance. We find that these attributes examined in the previous literature are related.
Issues with high levels of earnings management are usually smaller, nonventure-backed IPOs, marketed by less prestigious underwriters. However, earnings management, underwriter reputation and venture capital backing are not the manifestation of one phenomenon and the ability of each to predict the IPO long-run performance differs. The return spread between extreme portfolios generated from two or three factors combined is larger than that from any individual factor. That is, each individual factor has its own contribution to IPO long-run return predictability. Accordingly, our results suggest that the joint effect of these factors on the long-run performance of newly listed firms is more important than the individual effect of any one of them.
We also qualify findings in previous studies. We document that the earnings management effect, reported in Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) , holds for both small and large IPOs and is particularly strong in small IPOs. We find that the earnings management effect is primarily due to the underperformance of IPO firms with high discretionary accruals (DA). Though it's unlikely that all IPO firms manipulate earnings prior to going public, it is plausible that high DA proxies for deteriorating business fundamentals that investors tend to ignore (Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2002) ).
Regarding underwriter reputation, we do not find an effect for the full sample, a finding consistent with Logue, Rogalski, Seward and Foster-Johnson (2002) . However, we find that large IPOs brought to the market by low reputation underwriters severely underperform. Thus, the underwriter reputation effect is observed only for large IPOs. One possible reason is that large issuers tend to choose prestigious investment bankers to guarantee the success of their IPO and obtain the bank's professional advice (Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) ). Further, the more prestigious investment bankers focus on larger offers not only because of the higher fee generated but also because of the post-IPO revenues from trading activity. There is evidence that smaller IPOs that succeed in the post-offer period seek higher reputation underwriters when they return to the market for a follow-up seasoned equity offer (Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2002) ). It may be more cost effective for prestigious underwriters to concentrate on larger offers, knowing that the more successful among the smaller issuers are likely to come back to them for subsequent offers. Therefore, if an issuing firm planning a large IPO chooses a lower reputation underwriter, it may be because the issuer has unfavorable information and is averse to scrutiny by the more prestigious houses.
Although we find that the venture capital effect is stronger in smaller IPOs in the univariate analysis, it is very helpful in predicting IPO long-run returns for both small and large IPOs in multivariate analysis.
Within smaller IPOs, the return predictability of venture-capital backing is robust and the underwriter reputation effect is non-existent. These results indicate that venture-capital backing is much more important than the underwriter's reputation for smaller firms going public (Hellmann and Puri (2002) ).
Among the larger IPOs, the VC effect is observed primarily within low level of earning management (low DA) offers that are managed by prestigious underwriters.
Finally, we identify a group of IPOs that consistently underperform and outperform their benchmark.
The underperforming IPOs are characterized by (i) high level of earnings management (high DA), (ii) absence of venture-capital backing and are (iii) managed by lower reputation underwriters. This result holds and is significant for the full sample as well as for small and large IPOs. On the flip side, larger IPOs (i) with venture-capital backing that have (ii) low level of earnings management (low DA) and are (iii) brought to the market by prestigious underwriters outperform the benchmark in the long-run. Thus, in the long-run performance of IPOs, we observe a nexus of the three effects and, especially within large IPOs, the three factors acting in concert give us universal losers and winners.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes how we select our sample and measure the degree of earnings management. Section II provides the methods we use to detect the IPO long-run returns. The empirical results are presented in section III, and the conclusions are contained in section IV.
I. Data

A. Sample Selection
Our IPO sample is selected from Thomson Financial's Securities Data Company (SDC) New Issues database for the period of 1980 to 1996. We exclude ADRs, closed-end funds, foreign firms, Primes and Scores, and REITs from the sample. That is, only domestic, primary stocks are examined in this study.
Reverse-LBOs, unit offerings, and spinoffs are also eliminated from the sample. To avoid the low-price stock effect (Loughran and Ritter (1996) ), we delete IPOs with offering price less than $5.00 and IPOs with total proceeds less than $5 million.
Sample firms are required to have stock returns from CRSP and accrual data from Compustat. To be consistent with earnings management literature, we follow Sloan (1996) to define accruals as in (1) To get the relative measure of accruals to control firm size, we divide accruals by average total 2 Collins and Hribar (2002) argue that accruals based on the balance sheet approach as in (1) are misstated due to mergers and acquisitions, discontinued operations and foreign currency gains and losses. To overcome this measurement problem, they use alternative measure of accruals based on statement of cash flows. However, cash flow statement is generally not available prior to 1988. As a result, we re-run our analyses by using discretionary current accruals as suggested in Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) . The results are very similar to what we report here. assets 3 . We also require sample firms to have change in sales, and property, plant and equipment to compute discretionary accruals which will be introduced in the next subsection.
B. Estimation of Earnings Management
Earnings management literature usually focuses on the analysis of discretionary accruals, part of accruals which proxy for management discretion on reported earnings. This is because non-discretionary accruals, the difference between total accruals and discretionary accruals, are necessary and used to reflect the business condition. For instance, high growth firms normally have increasing accounts receivable and inventories due to rapid sales, leading to high accruals. As a result, non-discretionary accruals are out of management control and only discretionary accruals are subject to earnings management. Since total accruals, but not discretionary accruals, are observable, we employ the most popular accrual model, Jones (1991) model, to measure the portion of accruals under the discretion of managers. This model separates accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals by regressing total accruals on the change in sales (∆Sales) and property, plant and equipment (PPE) as shown in equation (2). The change in sales is included in the regression because working capital is closely related to sales, while adding PPE to the model is to control depreciation expenses in accruals. Hence, non-discretionary accruals (NDA), estimated from the fitted values of the regression, are the expected accruals given firm's growth and fixed assets, while discretionary accruals (DA), the residuals of the regression, are unexpected accruals from the model. Since IPO firms do not have long history of accounting information, estimates of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals from time series data on each sample firm would not be possible. In order to obtain a more precise decomposition, we run a separate cross-sectional regression using equation (2) within each industry for each year. In particular, we collect all NYSE/AMEX/NSADAQ stocks with available data, and break them into 48 industry groups based on the classification in Fama and French (1997) . Then, in each year and each industry, we run regression equation (2) for all firms (including non-sample firms) with available data. To make sure that regressions are meaningful, if the number of firms in the industry in a certain year is less than 10, then all firms in that industry that year are dropped.
The coefficients for the industry in that year are instead replaced by the coefficients obtained for all firms in that year. In panel C of table I, we present the summary statistics. The total accruals, on average, are positive (mean 0.059), which is different from the accrual property in general firms. Chan et al (2002) show that general firms have small but negative accruals on average. This suggests that IPO firms tend to have higher accruals than the average firm. This may be due to high growth prior to going public. However, after controlling for sales growth, the DA is still high, with median ranking of 7, suggesting the possibility of earnings manipulation by IPO firms.
II. Methodology for Estimating Long-term Abnormal Returns
Our focus in this paper is to examine the differences in long-horizon stock performance for IPOs with different characteristics. One simple measure of long-run stock returns is buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). Barber and Lyon (1997) compare different approaches to detect long-horizon stock performance and conclude that BHAR is most appealing. The reason they favor BHAR is that the implied investment strategy is simplistic and is representative of the returns that a long-horizon investor might earn. The commonly used method to test long-run abnormal stock returns, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), on the other hand, does not precisely measure the investor experience. Although straightforward to estimate, CAR is problematic for it implicitly assumes frequent rebalancing, and is therefore associated with high transaction costs that are not reflected in the results. In addition, frequent rebalancing introduces concern about upward biases due to bid-ask bounce (Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983)), an issue further considered more recently by Canina, Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1998).
However, as Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) point out, BHAR may overstate the long-run performance since it can grow with the return horizon even when there is no abnormal return after the first period. Moreover, due to the skewness in the long-horizon returns, BHAR suffers more severe problems than CAR in statistical inferences. For example, CAR is usually computed by using monthly returns (which implicitly assume monthly portfolio rebalancing), while BHAR is at most rebalanced once a year. As a result, it's more likely that BHAR will have a much higher number than CAR, and thus the traditional t-test will be biased (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) and Barber and Lyon (1997) ).
To solve the skewness problem in BHAR, Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) show that the empirical p-values from bootstrapping (i.e., simulated empirical distribution of long-run abnormal returns) are appropriate in testing long-horizon returns in random sample. However, Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) also find that when the sample is not random, such as industry-clustering and unusual pre-event returns, the bootstrapping approach still generate biases.
One major reason for undesirable biases of bootstrapping in non-random samples is the cross-sectional dependence in BHAR. Since BHAR is computed over long-horizon, it's very likely that a lot of sample firms' BHAR are overlapped in different months, making strong cross-sectional correlations among long-horizon returns. Unfortunately, bootstrapping cannot remove the biases from the cross-sectional dependence.
The solution proposed by Fama (1998) and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) is to run time-series regressions on a calendar-time portfolio. In particular, for each calendar month, obtain the return for each sample firm which had an event in the last four years, and then get the portfolio return in that month.
Re-form the portfolio every month. As a result, a time series of portfolio returns is available to run the three-factor model (Fama and French (1993) ) regressions as follows:
where r p is the sample firm portfolio return, r f is the risk-free rate, r m is the market portfolio return, SMB is small-firm portfolio return minus big-firm portfolio return, HML is the high-BM portfolio return minus low-BM portfolio return. SMB and HML are used to control size and BM effects, respectively. The abnormal returns can be tested based on the t-values of the regression intercept alphas. This approach is appealing in that there is much less skewness for short-run returns and we can easily control the heteroskedasticity to eliminate the biases in computing t-statistics of alphas.
To balance out all arguments regarding the methodology of long-run returns, we follow Fama (1998) and use equation (5) to detect long-run performance of IPOs. An IPO firm is included in the calendar-time portfolio starting from the 5th month, up until the 52 month, after its first post-IPO fiscal year-end. To increase the power of the test, if for any month the number of IPOs is less than 5, we drop that month.
III. Empirical Results
A. Univariate Analysis
The univariate analysis results are presented in Table II . In Panel A the sorting variable is DA. It is evident that DA is widely dispersed. The highest DA quartile has a DA ranking of 9.8 (out of 10), suggesting an unusually high level. The corresponding cash flows, however, are negative, while earnings are highest among the four quartiles. This result is suggestive of earnings manipulation (high earnings are due to the high accruals, rather than high cash flows). The Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation rank (CMR) is low for high DA firms. High DA IPOs also tend to be VC-backed less frequently, and are relatively smaller. The initial returns between low and high DA offers are not significantly different.
Regarding the long-run performance, we find that high DA offers underperform, while low DA IPOs tend to outperform their benchmark. The difference is significant for both the equally-weighted and the value-weighted long-run results. The DA effect (low DA -high DA) is primarily due to the underperformance of high DA. Further, the DA effect seems to be stronger in smaller IPOs because we observe a monotonic relationship between DA and returns in equally-weighted cases.
In Panel B, we sort IPOs by the Carter-Manaster underwriter reputation ranks (CMR). The 'Low' CMR quartile contains IPOs with CMR less than 6, '2' for IPOs with CMR greater or equal to 6 but less than 8, '3' for CRM equal to 8, and 'High' for CMR greater than 8.
The Low CMR quartile has higher DA. Low CMR also has negative cash flows, similar to the results observed for the High-DA quartile in Panel A. However, the earnings for the Low CMR offers are lowest among the four quartiles, a result different from that observed for the High-DA offers. This difference suggests that although DA and CMR are related the correlation is not strong and that DA and CMR sorting are not the same. The low reputation group has a very low average CMR ranking and has a lot of small IPOs that are not venture-capital backed. The initial return is not very different between low and high CMR, 14% versus 13.8% respectively.
The long-run performance results indicate that low CMR IPOs underperform, but there is no outperformance evident for high CMR offers. The difference between high and low CMR quartiles is marginally significant for the equally-weighted case. However, a significant CMR effect is observed in the value-weighted cases. These results suggest that the CMR effect is more significant for larger IPOs.
Finally, given that the DA effect is more evident in equally-weighted cases, and the CMR effect is more evident in value-weighted cases, a large portion of return predictability of DA is not from the CMR-effect.
Panel C consists of one-way results where the sorting variable is VC. The nonventure-backed group has higher DA, cash flows, and earnings. This is different from Panel B result for the Low CMR group where the corresponding earnings are low. Also, the difference of CMR between nonventure-backed and VC-backed offers is not large. These figures suggest that the correlation between CMR and VC should not be high.
The nonventure-backed IPOs are not necessarily smaller. They have higher sales. The initial returns between nonventure-backed and VC-backed offers are 12.3% and 14.6% respectively. Over the long run, nonventure-backed IPOs underperform. Although the underperformance is more evident in equally-weighted cases, the nonventure-backed offers also underperform in value-weighted cases.
B. Univariate Analysis by Size
In Table III we assess the impact of size on the factors examined in Table II . Low DA offers underperform consistently in the small IPOs sub-sample. The result is significant in both equally-weighted and value-weighted cases. The equally-weighted long-run results are significant for large IPOs as well but in the value-weighted case, the t-stat for high DA underperformance is only -1.68.
DA effect is more robust and monotonic in small IPOs, but the magnitude of DA effect is roughly the same between small and big IPOs.
In Panel B, we find that the distribution of IPOs brought to the market by different quality of investment bankers and the CMR effect are closely related to firm size. Small IPOs have much lower reputation underwriters on average. For instance, nearly 34% and 15.5% of the smaller IPOs are brought to the market by the lowest and highest reputation underwriters respectively. In contrast, less than 1% and nearly 45% of the larger IPOs have the least and most prestigious underwriters respectively. We find no effect in small IPOs. However, we document a strong CMR effect in big IPOs and this result is driven primarily by the severe underperformance of large IPOs brought to the market by low reputation underwriters.
Nonventure-backed, small IPOs underperform in both equally-weighted and value-weighted cases.
Nonventure-backed, big IPOs also underperform but this result is not significant in value-weighted cases.
It appears that very large non-venturebacked IPOs do not underperform. The DA effect is remarkably different from the CMR effect. DA effect works for both small and big IPOs, and it is more robust in small IPOs. On the other hand, CRM effect can only be observed in big IPOs. Similarly, VC effect is different from CMR effect since VC effect appears to be more robust in small IPOs as well.
There seems to have some correlation between DA and VC effects since both are more robust in small IPOs. However, when we examine the cash flows in each case we find that nonventure-backed and high DA offers behave differently. In big IPOs, nonventure-backed effect is different from high DA since the nonventure-backed issuers have high cash flows, while high DA firms have negative cash flows. In small IPOs, nonventure-backed issuers have cash flows close to zero, while high DA issuers have very negative cash flows, suggesting that the NonVC and high DA effects are different. All these results suggest that each of the three effects, namely DA, CMR and VC, have their own source of return predictability. Introducing all three factors together should help in explaining the cross-sectional returns of IPOs. Table IV we examine the joint effects of discretionary accruals (DA) and underwriter reputation (CMR). Panel A has the results for the full sample, while the small and big IPO sub-sample results are reported in Panels B and C respectively.
C. Multivariate Analysis
C.1: Discretionary Accrual and Underwriter Reputation: In
In Panel A, we document that the high DA/low CMR combination underperform consistently. Both the equally-weighted and value-weighted results are significant. 4 The DA effect is significant in equally-weighted cases (significant for column (13), (14), (15)), and the underwriter reputation tends to be significant in value-weighted cases (significant for column (4), (8), (12)). These findings suggest that the DA effect is more pronounced for smaller IPOs and that the underwriter reputation effect is more significant for the larger offers. These results are consistent with previous tables and show that the DA and CMR effects are not the same. Accordingly, we find that the underperformance of high DA/low CMR is more profound than that of either high DA or that of low CMR, individually (as observed in Table II) .
Further, high reputation underwriters are not especially good at picking low DA offers. However, it is interesting to observe that high DA IPOs brought to the market by prestigious underwriters (high CMR) do not underperform. The significant difference in long-run performance between high and low DA offers are found only for the lower reputation underwriters (low CMR) in the full sample as well as in the small and large sub-sample results.
In Panel A, column (16), we examine the return spread of extreme portfolios (highDA/ lowCMRlowDA/highCMR). In the equally-weighted case [Panel A, column (16)], the major contribution of 0.99% (t = 2.99) is from DA, rather than CMR. Recall that in Table II , DA effect in equally-weighted case is 0.93% that can, by itself, explain the return in column (16). However, both DA and CMR contribute to the value-weighted results.
In Panel B, we have a surprise result that we qualify further and discuss with the results of Table VII.
The combination of low DA/ low CMR outperforms (column 1, value weighted result). This result is contradictory to finding a CMR effect for small IPOs and should be borne in mind when we examine the multivariate regression results. We provide a further qualification of this result along with other findings reported in Table VII .
In Panel C, returns increase monotonically with underwriter reputation in all instances, except in the Table IV , we do not observe any CMR effect in small IPOs.
Interestingly though, in big IPOs, the CMR effect seems to be more important than VC effect. We make this inference given the extreme portfolio return [column (12) is VC/high CMR -NonVC/low CMR] in Panel C is close to the CMR effect documented in Table III . Please note that this result does not appear to be driven by the venture-backed IPOs brought to the market by the outperformance of high reputation underwriters but by the underperformance of NonVC/low CMR combination, which in turn appears to be driven by the low CMR results documented in Table III. In the large IPOs, the CMR effect is significant for the nonventure-backed offers. It is also significant for the VC-backed (value weighted results only).
Finally, the VC effect is significant and consistent for low CMR only, suggesting that the venture capital backing has more influence on the long-run performance of IPOs managed by less prestigious investment bankers.
A surprise result that we discuss later in our results of are the first study to identify universal losers and winners, especially in a sample of large IPOs.
In Table VII We have a consistent result that the NonVC/high DA/low CMR combination produces losers.
However, for the value-weighted results, we cannot state that the combination of VC/low DA/high CMR produces winners. This is the only instance where the VC/low DA/high CMR grouping, although positive, is not significant.
In small IPOs, the CMR effect is not visible at all. We find that the long-run performance of the VC/low DA/low CMR combination is positive and significant (0.77%, t = 1.86 equally weighted and 1.33%, t = 2.65 value weighted). IPOs managed by low reputation underwriters significantly outperform the benchmark, especially in the value-weighted case. This is an intriguing result that we observed partially in Tables IV and VI . We offer a possible explanation for this VC/low DA/low CMR long-run performance result below.
The cost of accurate evaluation may be prohibitive relative to the fee generated from small IPOs business. Thus it is likely that the prestigious investment banking houses do not pay as much attention to the smaller IPOs. Further, they may realize that the low DA/high quality firms that they do not pursue (or reject) in the initial round are likely to seek their assistance for follow-on seasoned equity offerings.
Therefore, quite a few high quality (low DA) small IPOs have to resort to lower reputation underwriters (low CMR) to bring them to the market. Such small but good quality issuers (low DA) are unable to signal their quality and get pooled with small, high DA offers. One effect of small low DA issuers' inability to distinguish themselves from small high DA offers would be that their less prestigious lead underwriter is only able to obtain a relatively low offer price for their IPO. However, over time, as their quality is revealed, these low DA IPOs outperform their benchmark.
Finally, contrary to the underwriter reputation effect, we find that the long-run performance of high DA/ nonventure-backed offers underwritten by high reputation underwriters is significantly negative (-1.14%, t = -3.21 equally-weighted and, -1.31%, t = -3.47 value-weighted). A possible explanation may be that the higher reputation underwriters are able to price these low quality offers above their intrinsic value. However, over time, as their quality is revealed, these high DA IPOs underperform their benchmark.
In summary, it does appear that, in the small IPO sample, high reputation underwriters make errors of both types: they accept lousy projects and reject some potential winners. It should not be a surprise if we detect no underwriter reputation effect in the multivariate regression analyses for the small IPO sub-sample.
C.4.2: Discretionary Accrual, Underwriter Reputation and Venture Capital:, Panel C (Big IPOs
Sample):
First, the (VC -NonVC) difference is significant for the low DA/high CMR group. The VC effect for the high CMR group is driven by the result that the combination of VC/low DA/high CMR produces winners. Second, the CMR effect is significant only for the NonVC/high DA group (equally-weighted results). The CMR effect holds for the NonVC/high DA group because the grouping of NonVC/high DA/low CMR produces losers.
D. Cross-Sectional Regressions
In this section, we run event-time cross-sectional regressions to verify results presented in previous tables. The dependent variable is the four-year buy-and-hold return cumulative from the 5th month after the first post-IPO fiscal year-end. To be consistent with previous tables, we use dummy variables in regressions to represent different IPO groups. For example, 'DA quartile' takes values of 0, 0.333, 0.667, and 1 for lowest DA quartile, the next two DA quartiles, and the highest DA quartile, respectively. As a result, the coefficient of DA quartile indicates the difference of long-run returns between extreme DA quartiles. We also use continuous variables to perform robustness checks. To control the market movement, size and book-to-market effect, as well as the underpricing phenomenon, we add the CRSP value-weighted index return, market capitalization, book-to-market ratio and IPO initial return in the regressions as the control variables.
Panel A of In model 11 to 14, we use interaction dummy variables to identify IPO losers and winners.
Consistent with previous tables, high DA/low CMR group significantly underperforms and low DA/high CMR group outperforms. NonVC/high DA IPOs also underperform severely, while VC/low DA shows superior performance. The return difference between these two VC/DA extreme portfolios amounts to 75%, which is about 1.6% per month (a number very close to column 12 of Table V) . Nonventure-backed IPOs, which are in the lowest CMR tercile, also have significant negative over time. Combining DA, CMR and VC together, we find that VC/low DA/high CMR firms are the winners and IPOs with NonVC/high DA/low CMR are losers. All these results are consistent with results of two-way and three-way sorts.
In panel B, we run separate regressions for small and big IPOs. Generally, the results confirm to those in previous tables. The DA and VC effects exist for both small and big firms, while underwriter reputation does not work in small issuers. For large IPOs, the CMR effect is very strong (70%) since these issuers marketed by low ranking underwriters severely underperform (Table III) . As a result, the underwriter reputation seems to be the most important factor for IPO long-run returns of large firms.
Regarding the IPO groups with remarkable abnormal performance, all losers identified in Panel A are still losers no matter which sub-sample we examine. However, the winners in panel A (NonVC/high DA and VC/low DA/high CMR) outperform significantly only in big IPOs. This is because low DA offers tend to outperform and the CMR effect is strong in large IPOs (Table III) .
IV. Conclusions
In this study we examine previously identified determinants of IPO long-run performance. The factors examined are earnings management (measured by the level of discretionary accruals), venture capital backing, underwriter reputation (measured by Cater-Manaster underwriter ranking) and firm size.
The effects are examined for the full sample and separately for sub-samples of large and small IPOs. We find that the issuers' firm size matters, especially for the underwriter reputation effect. In the small IPOs sub-sample, the discretionary accruals and the venture capital backing effects are significant but we do not find evidence of a significant underwriter reputation effect. For the larger IPOs, we find that each of the three factors examined have return predictability and, importantly, the combined effect of the three is greater than the influence of any one of them.
Our examination of these factors yields some very interesting results in the IPO 'derby'. We identify a group of IPOs that underperform consistently. The 'losers' are characterized by the combined negative influence of each of the three factors, namely absence of venture capital backing, high levels of earnings management and low reputation underwriters.
Prior research has, at best, identified sub-sets of IPOs that do not underperform their benchmark. We 
Table I Sample Distribution and Summary Statistics
The sample consists of 2,567 IPOs in 1980-1996 with an offering price of at least $5 and total proceeds of at least $5 million. Closed-end funds, REITs, ADRs, foreign stocks, LBOs, spinoffs, and units are excluded from the sample. The sample firms are required to have available data to compute accruals at the first post-IPO fiscal year-end. DA is the discretionary accruals, obtained based on Jones (1991) model and described in the text. DA (Accruals) decile ranking is relative to all stocks with available accruals. Earnings are operating income after depreciation. Cash flows are the difference between earnings and accruals. All DA, accruals, cash flows and earnings are divided by average total assets. CMR is Carter-Manaster ranking of underwriter reputation. VC is a dummy variable with a value of 1 representing venture capital backed IPOs. Sales are expressed in millions. All accounting data items are evaluated at the first post-IPO fiscal year. Size is market value of equity at the 4th month-end after the first post-IPO fiscal year, and is expressed in millions. BM is book-to-market ratio computed by dividing book value of equity by size. EP is earnings-to-price ratio computed by dividing earnings by size. Sales growth is the one-year growth rate of sales, based on sales at the first post-IPO fiscal year and the year before. Size (BM) decile ranking is relative to NYSE stocks only. Initial return is the return from IPO offering price to first available closing price. Total proceeds are in millions. All accounting data items are evaluated at the first post-IPO fiscal year. Panel A reports the industry distribution based on Fama and French (1997) The sample consists of 2,567 IPOs in 1980-1996 with an offering price of at least $5 and total proceeds of at least $5 million. Closed-end funds, REITs, ADRs, foreign stocks, LBOs, spinoffs, and units are excluded from the sample. The sample firms are required to have available data to compute accruals at the first post-IPO fiscal year-end. DA is the discretionary accruals, obtained based on Jones (1991) model and described in the text. DA decile ranking is relative to all stocks with available accruals. Earnings are operating income after depreciation. Cash flows are the difference between earnings and accruals. All DA, cash flows and earnings are divided by average total assets. CMR is Carter-Manaster ranking of underwriter reputation. VC is a dummy variable with a value of 1 representing venture capital backed IPOs. Sales are expressed in millions. Size is market value of equity at the 4th month-end after the first post-IPO fiscal year, and is expressed in millions. BM is book-to-market ratio computed by dividing book value of equity by size. Size (BM) decile ranking is relative to NYSE stocks only. Initial return is the return from IPO offering price to first available closing price. All accounting data items are evaluated at the first post-IPO fiscal year. Long-run abnormal return is measured by the intercept of the following Fama-French (1993) three-factor regressions, The sample consists of 2,567 IPOs in 1980-1996 with an offering price of at least $5 and total proceeds of at least $5 million. Closed-end funds, REITs, ADRs, foreign stocks, LBOs, spinoffs, and units are excluded from the sample. The sample firms are required to have available data to compute accruals at the first post-IPO fiscal year-end. DA is the discretionary accruals, obtained based on Jones (1991) model and described in the text. DA decile ranking is relative to all stocks with available accruals. Earnings are operating income after depreciation. Cash flows are the difference between earnings and accruals. All DA, cash flows and earnings are divided by average total assets. CMR is Carter-Manaster ranking of underwriter reputation. VC is a dummy variable with a value of 1 representing venture capital backed IPOs. Sales are expressed in millions. Size is market value of equity at the 4th month-end after the first post-IPO fiscal year, and is expressed in millions. BM is book-to-market ratio computed by dividing book value of equity by size. Size (BM) decile ranking is relative to NYSE stocks only. Initial return is the return from IPO offering price to first available closing price. All accounting data items are evaluated at the first post-IPO fiscal year. For each year, all IPOs are classified as either small or big IPOs based on their median size value. Long-run abnormal return is measured by the intercept of the following Fama-French (1993) 
